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The UE and Civil society in Serbia:
Governance rather than politics
Adam Fagan and Mladen Ostojic
 
Introduction 
1 Following the demise of communism, support for civil society development has become a
top priority on the agenda of democracy assistance programmes implemented in Central
and Eastern Europe by Western governments, aid agencies and donors. This policy has led
to  the  emergence  of  a  ‘third  sector’  predominantly  composed  of  donor-driven  non-
governmental organisations that have acquired significant influence on the public sphere
in most transitional countries.
2 In Serbia, foreign assistance has been vital for upholding independent organisations and
medias  against  the  repression  of  an  authoritarian  regime  throughout  the  nineties.
Reminiscent  of  CEE  in  the  late  1980s,  a  coalition of  non-governmental  organisations
(NGOs) played a critical role in the downfall of Milosevic in October 2000 by campaigning
for free and fair presidential elections and helping to mobilize voters, particularly the
young. Civil society thus came to represent the liberal democratic conscience of Serbia.
For some commentators,  it  continues to provide a lens or vantage point on political
liberalisation, westernization, and the upholding of human and minority rights.
3 This paper looks at the impact of EU intervention on the third sector in post-Milosevic
Serbia. We argue that the framing of EU pre-accession assistance to Serbia in terms of
‘developing civil  society’  is  a  political  distraction;  it  obfuscates the true purpose and
outcomes of EU intervention by implying that the focus of aid is the empowerment and
strengthening of civil society as an arena of political contestation and as the basis of
democratic regime change. In practice, EU assistance has as its goal far less politically
radical objectives: the aim is to build governance and state capacity.
4 Indeed, we claim that the impact and outcomes of EU assistance has, in reality, little to do
with  democracy  promotion,  widening  political  participation,  or  extending
representation. Since its inception, EU assistance for civil society has largely by-passed
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those organisations engaged in criticism of the government. Instead it has privileged an
elite of professional NGOs engaged in policy development and service provision. In light
of  the  incomplete  regime  change  that  arguably  took  place  in  Serbia,  the  strategy
deployed by the EU has been criticized by human rights activists for having consolidated
the status of political elites that are unwilling to make a break with the past and embrace
the values and principles of liberal democracy. This state of affairs challenges the ability
of the current democracy assistance programmes to generate a positive impact at the
political level in transition countries. It even suggests that the action of the EU may have
generated  adverse  effects,  and raises  further  questions  regarding  how  foreign
interventions should be envisaged in societies where illiberal political groupings remain
influential.
5 We start with a brief discussion on civil society as conceptualised by donors as part of
development programmes and as a means for promoting democracy. In tune with other
recent scholarly analysis of  civil  society promotion and donor intervention,  we place
particular emphasis on the conflation of civil society with NGOs.1 In a second phase, we
consider  in  more  detail  the  political  and  legal  contexts  in  which  civil  society
development- or lack of it-  is  taking place in Serbia,  with particular reference to EU
assistance channelled through NGOs via short-term project grants. The final section looks
at the status of the politically engaged human rights activists and their interaction with
other  NGOs  and groupings  within  civil  society.  In  the  conclusion,  we  reflect  on  the
implications of  our analysis  for democracy assistance policies  and ponder how,  what
appears to be a divided and polarized “civil society”, impacts upon the process of regime
change.
 
Developing 'Civil Society': NGOs as a Strategy for
Democracy Promotion 
6 Whereas  a  comprehensive  analysis  of  'civil  society  development’  as  a  strategy  of
democracy-assistance clearly exceeds the scope of this paper, it is necessary to give a
brief overview of the developments that took place in this domain during the last two
decades in order to contextualise the situation in Serbia. Having played a pivotal role in
the demise of the communist regimes during the eighties, civil society was seen by many
observers as the most promising support for the implementation of liberal democracy in
Eastern Europe2. In response to the legacy of socialism during which the state exerted
control over, or had an overwhelming influence on, every aspect of the public sphere,
civil society was conceptualized as a political and social space in which citizens could
articulate their interests and challenge the exercise of power.
7 By the mid nineties, civil society development became a key tool in democracy assistance
programmes,  in  conjunction  with  support  for  electoral  processes  and  institutional
reforms that were already in place. In the ensuing period, significant amounts of foreign
aid  have  been  channelled  to  an  array  of  locally  established  non-governmental
organisations  that  sought  to  promote  democratization  through  advocacy  work,  civic
education, and the monitoring of elections and policies implemented by the government.
This has led to the emergence of  an affluent third sector composed of  western-style
professional  organizations  as  the  primary  recipients  of  foreign  aid  in  countries
experiencing  political  and  economic  transition.  These  NGOs  have  generally  been
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successful in establishing linkages within the elite circles, and some of them have gained
a considerable degree of political influence as they became involved in particular policy
areas. By supporting and coordinating the activities of these nonpartisan organisations,
foreign actors sought to exert an impact on the processes of democratisation in transition
countries without getting directly involved in domestic politics. The logic of supporting
democratization by developing civil society was reinforced by the advancement of the
notion of 'social capital' that became particularly prominent amongst Western policy-
makers  at  that  time.  This  concept  stressed the  importance  of  associational  life  in
fostering norms of reciprocity and trust that are essential for the active participation of
citizens  in  decision-making  processes  and  the  smooth  functioning  of  democratic
institutions.  Consequently,  there was a widespread belief that a 'vibrant civil  society'
constituted  a  necessary  element  for  the  implementation  of  plural  democracy  in
transitional societies, as well as for the good functioning of established democracies.
8 However, the concept of civil society adopted by international aid agencies and donors is
substantially different from the one suggested by most scholars dealing with democratic
theory. Indeed, international donors have endorsed a liberal notion of civil society based
on partnership with the state and the representation of diverse interests at the elite level.
In this view, the role of civic organisations is to assist the state in the implementation of
its  neo-liberal  agenda,  notably  by  taking  up  some  responsibilities  in  the  domain  of
regulation  and  social  protection.  Hence,  most  of  the  civil  society  development
programmes  focus  on building  the  capacity  of  interest  associations  to  participate  in
policy and decision making processes. This ‘partnership’ interpretation of civil society is
fundamentally different from the ‘radical’ understanding of the concept as a realm in
which power and dominant values can be contested. The latter perspective views civil
society  as  politically-engaged  grass-roots  movements  and  organizations  acting  as  a
vehicle for contesting political and economic power. It is a normative conception of civil
society that draws on the New Left Gramscian idea of a politicized, radical civil society, as
well as veering close to Jurgen Habermas or Hannah Arendt’s notion of a discursive public
sphere.  It  is  also  akin  to  the  implicit  and  fundamental  premises  of  earlier  liberal
interpretations  of  civil  society;  the  reclaiming  of  autonomous  critical  space  and  the
eighteenth-century notion of  trying to reconcile individual  self-interest  unleashed by
commercial activity with the common good.
9 It is from this perspective that some political scientists have questioned the capacity of
'civil  society  development'  programmes  to  foster  democratic  consolidation  in  recent
years.  Research shows that,  while  these  organisations  have  certainly  produced some
positive effects on policy, service provision and governance, their capacity to represent
citizens’ interests remains weak owing to their remoteness from the local population3.
Donors have largely overlooked the existing citizen’s networks and associations present
in the recipient countries, focusing instead on those organisations that complied with
their strict criteria in terms of activity and administrative capacity. This contributed to
the creation of a donor-led, elite-based, and professionalized NGO sector that is largely
isolated from the societies surrounding it. Critiques argue that foreign intervention has
disengaged the NGO sector from domestic constituencies, and thus prevented them from
creating  social  linkages.  In  this  context,  the  legitimacy  of  non-representative
organisations to play an active role in political life is highly questionable.
10 Nevertheless,  democracy  assistance  constitutes  a  vital  support  for  opposition  to
authoritarian  regimes.  In  societies  where  political  space  is  restricted,  foreign
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intervention  can  play  a  critical  role  in  mobilising  and  organising  opposition  to  the
regime.  Democracy  assistance has  proved  particularly  conducive  for  undermining
‘electoral’ or ‘competitive’ authoritarianism. The overthrow of Milosevic in Serbia is a
case  in  point.  Indeed,  foreign  aid  was  vital  for  upholding  civic  organisations  and
independent media against the repression orchestrated by the regime throughout the
nineties. Whilst initially limited to small-scale projects, democracy assistance developed
into a major instrument for undermining Milosevic’s rule after the end of the Kosovo
crisis. Foreign donors sought to organise and increase the capacity of opposition political
parties,  civil  society organisations and independent media in order to overthrow the
regime through elections. This strategy had already proved successful in removing semi-
authoritarian regimes in Slovakia (1996) and Croatia (1999). As Milosevic called for early
elections to be held on 24 September 2000, foreign donors intensified their efforts to
foster opposition to the regime4.  Besides providing training and funding for political
parties,  they supported electoral  monitoring organisations  and NGOs campaigning to
mobilize the voters. External support amply contributed to the victory of the democratic
coalition in the elections, as well as to the success of the popular mobilisation that led to
the fall of Milosevic on 5 October 20005. However, this outcome would have been unlikely
in  the  absence  of  a  pre-existing  network  of  well–established  civic  organisations.  As
Carothers points out, the success of foreign intervention needs to be put in the context of
‘a decade long struggle by Serbian opposition politicians and civic activists to challenge
the hold of Milosevic and the SPS of Serbia’.
 
Political and Legal Framework for NGOs in Serbia
11 Since the downfall  of  Milosevic,  Serbian ‘civil  society’  has  been characterised by the
dichotomy between a core of politically ‘approved’ (but essentially apolitical and non-
contentious) organisations that are involved in partnerships with state agencies and the
government  in  the  context  of  service  provision  and  EU-funded  initiatives;  and  a
politically  ostracised and media-targeted tier  of  long-established,  ideologically  liberal
organisations that played a significant role in the opposition to Milosevic during the late
1990s.
12 During Kostunica’s term in office, the DSS has been overtly hostile towards civil society
organisations, in particular, the more overtly political organisations working on human
rights issues, such as the Helsinki Committee and the Humanitarian Law Centre. Though they
were not publicly castigated in the same way, there was nevertheless a latent suspicion of
the foreign funded apolitical NGOs involved in EU development projects. These supposed
partners of the government and state agencies were tolerated insofar as they enabled the
government to gain EU project funding6. The Democratic Party representatives, such as
Milan Markovic, the former minister for Public Administration and local government,
were  generally  more  positive  about  the  role  of  NGOs,  or  at  least  recognised  the
importance  of  civil  society  organisations  in  fostering  good  relations  with  the  EU.
However, the most vocal support for civil society came from President Tadic, whose pro-
EU stance no doubt explains his recent decision to establish the ‘Council for Relations
with Civil Society’. The Council, which consists of 8 members drawn from the NGO sector,
is the only formal institutional representation for civil society in Serbia.
13 Critics of the Serbian government’s attitude towards civil society have focused either on
the absence of a coherent legal and fiscal infrastructure from within which NGOs and civil
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society organisations can maximise their role and influence, or have sought to highlight
the political  animosity  and deliberate  condemnation of  organisations  deemed by the
‘regime’ to be political opponents. The two issues are, of course, connected: the former
Kostunica  government  lacked  the  political  will  to  strengthen  civil  society  and  this
explains why the draft  law on NGOs was not enacted. Indeed,  the law was originally
drafted in 2001 and was about  to  be presented to parliament  for  ratification by the
reformist  government  of  Zoran  Djindjic.  His  assassination  and  the  collapse  of  his
government delayed the passage of the legislation. The law was about to be presented to
parliament again towards the end of 2006, just prior to the collapse of the first Kostunica
government.  Its  adoption  has  been  further  delayed  by  the  instability  of  Kostunica’s
second  government.   It  is  almost  certain  that  the  law  will  be  enacted  during  this
parliament; the current coalition government has adopted the draft law in July 2008. The
Council  of  Europe  and,  rather belatedly,  the  EU  have  exerted  pressure  on  the  new
government to enact the law.7 However, even when it is passed the law will only offer
NGOs basic legal status; their capacity to raise funds, to gain tax exemption and to exist
financially as charitable organisations will have to be enshrined in subsequent legislation.
Nevertheless, granting NGOs legal status effectively gives them recognition in Serbia as
legitimate entities. Such is the animosity that has been directed towards NGOs in recent
years, this is seen as an important first stage. 
 
The EU’s Approach to Civil Society Development in
Serbia
14 The EU has focused on civil society as a development priority for Serbia only recently
and, nearly a decade since the demise of Milosevic, somewhat belatedly. Since 2000, EU
assistance has largely been geared towards the requirements of enlargement and the
conditions of the Stabilization and Association process (SAp):  institution building, the
strengthening  of  the  country’s  infrastructure,  justice  and  home  affairs,  economic
development  and  cross-border  co-operation.  Whilst  re-building  the  economy  and
developing the infrastructure in order to attract  foreign investment have been over-
riding  priorities,  this  has  been  combined  with  measures  to  strengthen  democratic
governance and political processes.
15 Support  designated  specifically  for  civil  society  -  not  as  part  of  a  reconstruction  or
infrastructure project - is a more recent focus and has only become a designated aid
objective since 2007 as part of the IPA (Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance). Indeed,
during the 1990s it was American donors such as the Soros and Rockerfeller foundations
that provided support to the civil  society organisations battling against the Milsoevic
regime. During this period the EU dealt directly with the government rather than with
NGOs; after October 2000 and the change of leadership, more emphasis was placed on
working  with  civil  society  and  building  partnerships  around  emergency  relief  and
infrastructural development. The Zagreb Summit of 2000 and the start of the Stability and
Association process with what was then still the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was in a
sense a turning point, enabling local NGOs to gain access to resources through the CARDS
programme  and  various  EIDHR  initiatives  designed  to  build  state  capacity,  improve
administrative know-how, or develop the provision of social services.8
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16 The European Agency for Reconstruction (EAR). EU assistance for civil society development
has been administered by the semi-autonomous European Agency for  Reconstruction
(EAR),  which represents  the  main arm of  EU assistance  in  Serbia.  Support  for  NGOs
therefore began in the context of the provision of emergency energy relief in Kosovo
immediately after the ending of hostilities between NATO and the Milosevic government9.
It  is  important  to  note,  that  although NGOs  are  routinely  engaged  as  implementing
partners, or are granted service contracts and tenures, most EAR funding is channelled
through the government of Serbia in the form of large infrastructure projects, which are
signed directly with the state. Today, most EU aid and assistance for Serbia, as part of
CARDS, is administered by the EAR, which, via its regional office in Belgrade, implements
the Commission’s Annual Action Programmes for the country.  The Agency essentially
implements schemes and projects agreed by the Commission and the Serbian government
10.
17 Though the EAR does not specifically involve itself with democratic development, there is
obviously overlap, particularly with regard to supporting civil society organizations and,
as is the case with nearly all EU initiatives and assistance, EAR projects tend to involve
local NGOs in some way, either as implementing partners or as direct beneficiaries of
projects. In all its various schemes the agency places emphasis on partnerships between
NGOs and government. For example, as part of the Agency’s €6 million scheme to provide
specialised equipment to vocational education and training centres, local NGOs have been
involved in delivering various aspects of the reform and in providing training.
18 Of the €1.28 billion of  aid committed to the country overall  since 2002,  the EU has,
through the Agency, provided €11.5 million specifically for the support of civil society11.In
2006-7  the  EAR  ran  7  grant  programmes  designed  specifically  for  civil  society
development,  which benefited local NGOs in 50 municipalities in central  and western
Serbia. These programmes tended to target organisations operating in socially deprived
areas,  working  on  issues  and  in  areas  where  the  EAR  is  already  active;  namely,
environment, education, EU compliance and promotion, and regional integration. The
administration and monitoring of these small grant projects was out-sourced to various
implementing partners, such as the European Movement, a local NGO network. 
19 The overriding aim of such civil society assistance has been to engage local NGOs in joint
projects, to build their managerial and administrative capacity to manage projects, and to
enable organisations to apply for further funding. Generally much of the agency’s aid for
NGOs  has  focused  on  strengthening  the  capacity  of  civil  society  organisations  to
participate  in  policy  development  and  the  implementation  of  poverty  reduction
measures.  Local  NGOs have also  been supported to  deliver  various  social  services  in
conjunction  with  local  authorities.  In  particular,  the  aid  has  been  targeted  towards
supporting  civil  society  organisations  and  encouraging  them  to  participate  in  the
preparation of the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper through the setting up of the Civil
Society Advisory Committee, a forum of local NGOs. The aim here being to augment the
input of NGOs within consultation processes around local poverty reduction strategies. 
20 EU funds  have also  been used to  establish a  Social  Innovation Fund (SIF),  which,  in
conjunction with the Ministry of Social Affairs (now the Ministry of Labour, Employment
and Social Policy),  has provided resources for joint projects between government and
non-governmental  sectors  with  particular  regard  to  economic  regeneration  and
development,  employment  and  social  service  provision.  In  addition,  a  separate  fund
(Fund to Support Civil Society) designed to support projects concerned with improving
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the legislative and fiscal context in which NGOs operate was established. This Fund has
also  helped  to  strengthen  the  input  of  NGOs  within  planning  and  implementing
community development programmes.
21 What appear to be a myriad of EAR initiatives, all seeking to support civil society in some
way or  other,  have  at  their  core  the  objective  of  building  NGO capacity  for  project
management,  and  to  develop the  agency  of  NGOs  within  various  broader  policy
initiatives.  The Agency’s commitment to working closely with NGOs and to providing
what it describes as ‘on the job training’ (budget psycho-management, record-keeping,
accounting  as  well  as  tutelage  on  EU  norms  and  practices)  reflects  the  underlying
emphasis on supporting and professionalizing civil society organisations as a means of
realising broader development objectives – economic regeneration, policy compliance,
and bureaucratic efficiency. In terms of improving the project management capacity of
the  NGO  sector,  the  EAR  believes  it  has  been  reasonably  successful:  over  60%  of
applications used to fail the first stage of the process because the log-frame or other
aspects of the form had not been completed correctly. In 2006-7 this was reduced to only
30%, which does suggest an improvement in the quality of applications and know-how
within  the  NGO  sector.  This  improvement  is  aided  by  the  existence  of independent
experts in Serbia who now provide NGOs with training and assistance12.
22 In its administration of EU funds, the Agency acknowledges a fundamental constraint
with  regard  to  developmental  assistance  based  on  trying  to  build  interaction  and
partnership between NGOs and government: most initiatives and the interaction between
local actors is invariably donor-driven, with the threat that once the project ends the
communication  will  also  end.  However,  certain  positive  legacies  and  sustainable
outcomes have occurred;  an EAR field  manager  with responsibility  for  local  projects
observed:
23 ‘In Versac (in the north east of Serbia), they (a women’s NGO) were talking to the mayors
because we were there…because of the project. But when I went back 12 months later, the
municipality had provided a fund for NGOs.’13
24 The local delegation of the European Commission to Serbia. From January 2009, on closure of
the EAR, the European Commission’s administering Delegation to the Republic of Serbia
(‘the Delegation’) will assume responsibility for and co-ordinating EU assistance to the
country.  The Delegation administers  EIDHR micro projects,  which have only recently
been made available  to  Serbia  and are  awarded to  local  NGOs.  For  the  first  call for
proposal  in  July  2006,  the  themes  were  ‘fostering  a  culture  of  human  rights’  and
‘advancing equality, tolerance and peace’, which are typical initiatives promoted by the
EIDHR14. The number of applications from NGOs received was 108, out of which 21 project
awards were made. The project grants allocated are relatively small, delivering between
€20-80,000  to  recipient  organisations,  mostly  for  self-contained,  year-long  projects.
Although most of the funded projects involved the lead NGOs working across the country
in collaboration with local partners, the majority of recipients were Belgrade-based NGOs
with an established reputation for managing projects. In other words, projects tend to be
broad in terms of their geographic reach, but the successful NGOs tend to be based in the
capital and to have a proven track-record.
25 EU-funded projects in Serbia: focus, impact and outcomes. The EU is rapidly becoming the main
donor for NGOs and civil society organisations in Serbia. Whilst several of the European
and American donors have withdrawn or scaled down their involvement, the EU is setting
the agenda for those that remain, both with regard to the focus of assistance and in terms
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of organisational management and delivery expectations.  In other words,  the EU is a
critical player and through its micro and macro grants is defining the operational and
organisational norms of recipient NGOs15.
26 The majority of projects funded by the EU in Serbia involve some kind of partnership,
however nominal, between NGOs and government. Indeed, as already noted, the bulk of
EU funding actually benefits the Serbian government, either directly as contracts and
tenures  for  specific  infrastructure  development,  or  indirectly  through project  grants
involving NGOs.
27 Whilst  the  latter  mostly  involve  NGOs offering a  social  or  public  service  that  is  not
otherwise being provided, the EU, via the EAR, encourages the government to stimulate
NGO  activity  and  co-operate  with  the  non-governmental  sector.  In  other  words,  in
channelling  its  aid  through  organisations  is  ostensibly  engaging  and  targeting  the
government. This is reflected in the nature and focus of funded projects: for example,
psychosocial support for victims of torture and the rehabilitation of concentration camp
victims16,  or  contain an education,  training or employment skills  component,  usually
targeting  a  specific  marginalised  community,  or  working  specifically  with  internally
displaced persons (IDPs) in a particular area17. Several projects provided training for key
workers  such  as  prison  guards,  teachers  or  social  workers.  There  were  also  several
examples of projects focusing on some form of human rights education for high school
students or younger children and their parents.
28 The  Belgrade  Centre  for  Human  Rights,  which  has  been  successful  in  2  out  of  the  3
applications it has made to the EAR, is typical of the sort of Serbian NGO that receives EU
project grants. It is relatively long established (1995), employing more than 10 full-time
staff the majority of whom are professionals recruited for their specific expertise. The
organisation has international links (they are the Serbian branch of the International
Association  of  Human  Rights  Institutes),  and  the  director  is  an  academic  who  has
significant experience in applying for and managing project grants. The organisation has
little apparent difficulty in securing the 20% match funding from another donor that the
EU requires.  Additional donors have included various embassies,  foreign development
agencies and multi-lateral donors18.
29 But not all skills training programmes funded by the EU deliver sustainable outcomes.
Unless a state agency or local municipality takes over the running of the provision, or
provides funding for the NGO to continue with the project, the sustainable long-term
benefit of such skills and training projects is limited. It is not possible for the organisation
to apply for additional revenue from the EU to extend the project. The only option for an
NGO is to apply for a different project on a similar theme, but this depends on whether
the theme of the latest call for projects is relevant. 
30 Recent calls for proposals as part of both CARDS and EIDHR have focused on aspects of
minority and human rights. Not surprisingly, several funded projects therefore contain a
human  and  minority  rights  dimension,  usually  focusing  on  providing  support  to
marginalised groups within civil society, either in the context of helping them exercise
their legal rights or in terms of enabling them to access economic, social and political
resources. Unless the outcome of such projects is direct advocacy around a new piece of
human  or  minority  rights  legislation  emanating  from  an  international  treaty  or
agreement that  Serbia has signed,  or  results  in more effective implementation of  an
existing law, the sustainability of project outcomes is questionable. The dilemma faced by
a recipient organisations is that a short-term project of between €50 - 100,000 enables
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them only to help a fraction of those affected. For example, the organisation Pomoc Deci
has received several EU project grants to work on strengthening the capacity of Roma
organisations and communities,  and assisting Roma communities  with the process of
birth registration. However, due to EU rules and procedures, it was not possible to extend
any of the projects into neighbouring communities, or to widen the scope of the provision
beyond the terms of the award.
31 EU assistance supposedly targeted towards civil society organisations and NGOs with the
intention of  engaging them in partnerships with the government as part of  the EU’s
commitment to building “good governance” has delivered a limited ‘partnership’ impact.
In large part this is due to the fact that from the outset the focus of EU assistance in
Serbia, delivered through the EAR, was infrastructure reconstruction and energy sector
modernization.  What  might  be  termed democracy  promotion,  human rights,  or  civil
society development aspects of EU assistance have only recently become a focus, largely
as a consequence of the SAp and pre-accession considerations. The most tangible legacy
of EU assistance in Serbia would appear to be the existence of a small tier of Belgrade-
based professional NGOs with significantly developed capacity to apply for and manage
small and medium sized grants. There is little evidence of the diffusion of expertise and
know  how  to  small  local  organisations,  nor  an  increased  capacity  of  the  larger
organisations to take on larger projects. 
32 This then begs the question as to whether recipients of EU civil  society development
assistance represent civil society as such, are connected with citizens’ networks, and the
extent  to  which  they  perform a  political  function  other  than assisting  in  legislative
approximation and policy development. Even with regard to NGOs assuming these policy-
related functions, some doubt is cast on the impact of assistance: when and where it
occurs at all, the interaction between recipient NGOs and government or state agencies
happens at a low level and invariably involves little more than the granting of licenses or
the provision of data.  If  NGOs do gain access to policy foras as a consequence of EU
projects, it is in the context of collating data and producing reports. Most of the activities
generated by CARDS funding involved NGOs providing services in communities either in
lieu of, or in conjunction with the state and the market. The main findings of the research
into EU assistance channelled through NGOs, carried out in Serbia during 2007, can be
summarised thus: 
• A core of professional organisations with developed management know-how and
organisational capacity exists, mostly within Belgrade. 
• These organisations dominate each round of project grants, work closely with the EAR and
the Serbian Office for European Integration, as well as with certain pro-European ministries
and state agencies. 
• Assistance benefits a small elite of NGOs, located usually in Belgrade or in other large urban
centres (little evidence of diffusion to rural or local level civil society organisations – unless
they have been contracted by the large NGOs as implementing partners ‘in the field’) 
• Assistance thus entrenches existing hierarchies within the community of NGOs
• The same core organisations dominate each project grant round, largely because they now
posses ‘capacity’ to apply for and manage EU small grants
• Funded projects focus on service provision in lieu of the state or the market; the provision of
policy-related information of data
• All projects are short-term (typically 12-18 months) and that the interaction between NGO
recipients and state agencies is minimal and superficial
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• Little monitoring on behalf of the EU takes place at the local level; none by the Commission
in Brussels. Key criteria of success are reporting that the objectives of the project have been
met and that the money has been spent.
 
Human Rights NGOs as an Instance of ‘Political’ Civil
Society 
33 In stark contrast  with the ‘institutionalized’  NGOs,  the major domestic  human rights
advocacy groups (HRG) continue to experience a difficult relationship with the Serbian
authorities. The widely unpopular and politicized nature of their activities, essentially
centred on issues of war crimes and transitional justice, makes them a prime target of
nationalist attacks and an uneasy partner for reformist elites. Essentially composed of
Belgrade-based  intellectuals,  most  of  these  organisations  were  established  in  the
beginning  of  the  nineties  as  anti-war  movements.  During  Milosevic’s  rule,  they
represented  an  alternative  voice  to  the  domestic  nationalist  discourse,  and  became
internationally  prominent  by  exposing  the  war  crimes  and  human  rights  abuses
perpetrated by the Serbian authorities. Like most independent organisations, the HRGs
were  the  targets  of  continuous  repression  by  a  semi-authoritarian  regime,  which
tolerated critics only to the extent that they did not endanger its hold on power.
34 In spite of the political changes initiated in October 2000, the activities of human rights
organisations remained highly contentious and unwelcome by the authorities. The new
government  clearly had no  intention of  addressing  the  human rights  violations  and
atrocities perpetrated by the former regime in the neighbouring countries and at home.
This became obvious, as cooperation with The Hague Tribunal proved difficult due to
opposition  within  the  ranks  of  the  new  political  elite.  The  failure  of  the  Yugoslav
Commission for Truth and Reconciliation further corroborated this state of affairs.  It
exposed  in  broad  daylight  the  irreconcilable  ideological  divisions  and  conflicting
interests  within  the  ruling  class.  On the  one  hand,  civil  society  activists  and liberal
fractions in government promoted the idea of creating a truth commission in order to
establish a  record of  human rights  violations perpetrated by the former regime and
redress the victims. On the other hand, the conservative circles represented by Kostunica,
who established the commission through a presidential decree, saw it as an opportunity
for  consolidating  the  nationalist  narrative  and  appeasing  the  pressure  of  the  Hague
Tribunal. In those circumstances, this initiative proved unworkable from the start.
35 The transitional justice agenda was thus taken on by domestic HRGs, which were already
fully integrated in regional and international human rights networks as a result of their
activism during the nineties. These organisations constituted an important source of local
support for the war crimes trials at the International Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia
(ICTY). They assisted the prosecutor’s office in putting together evidence and providing
legal expertise, as well as material and psychological support for victims at the local level.
Local organisations, such as the Humanitarian Law Centre and the Lawyer’s committee for
Human Rights, also participated in the dissemination of the court’s findings in partnership
with the ICTY’s outreach office in Belgrade. In addition, the HRGs have played a major
role  in  supporting  and monitoring  domestic  war  crimes  trials  since  the  War  Crimes
Chamber was established at the Belgrade District Court in 2003.
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36 In terms of advocacy work, human rights organisations have focused their activities on
sensitising public opinion over the devastating legacy of nationalism and war - a project
commonly  labelled  ‘facing  the  past’.  This  primarily  consists  in  promoting  public
acknowledgement of past atrocities and exerting pressure on the authorities in order to
generate political accountability. The campaign reached a peak in the summer of 2005, as
the tenth anniversary of the Srebrenica massacre was approaching. It was marked by the
broadcasting of a video footage featuring the execution of six Bosniak teenagers from
Srebrenica by members of the Serb paramilitary unit ‘Škorpioni’. This video, which was
made  public  by  the  HLC,  instantly  sparked  off  public  debate  over  the  Srebrenica
massacre. This was further pressed forward through the organization of public actions,
such as the provocative display of billboards reminding the residents of Belgrade about
Srebrenica. Eight NGOs came together to form a lobby group in order to put forward a
draft declaration condemning the massacre in Srebrenica for the Serbian parliament to
adopt. The initiative was eventually turned down due to the opposition of the far–right
Radical Party, Milosevic’s Serbian Socialist party, and the Serbian Democratic Party of
Prime Minister Kostunica. Nevertheless, it succeeded in bringing the issue of war crimes
into domestic politics, and led president Tadic to symbolically attend the commemoration
of the tenth anniversary of the Srebrenica massacre.
37 The HRGs were overtly critical towards Kostunica’s government, which they blamed for
perpetuating public denial of atrocities committed in the name of the Serbian nation and
reinforcing the political culture of ethno-nationalism. Indeed, the members of this group
of organisations generally perceived and portrayed the new authorities as an extension of
the nationalist rule established in the nineties.  But political contestation came at a high
cost. The major human rights organizations incarnated by Natasa Kandic, Sonja Biserko,
and  Biljana  Kovacevic-Vuco  were  subject  to  a  fierce  campaign  of  intimidation  and
harassment orchestrated by the most conservative elements in society. The onslaught
against what amounts to less than ten organisations were predominantly personal and
extremely vindictive. The prominent women who run several of these organisations have
been the target of verbal attacks and harassment perpetrated by politicians and leading
media  commentators.  As  well  as  their  sanity  and  loyalty  to  the  state  being  put  to
question, they are accused of being part of the communist elite, or not being truly Serb19.
Questions have also been raised regarding the financing of these organizations, with the
suggestion that they are the recipients of illegal funding, or are on the payroll of various
international mafias. On top of that, human rights activists and independent journalists
have been subject to physical assaults on several occasions. In April 2007, a prominent
journalist who extensively covered the issue of war crimes was the target of a bomb
attack in the centre of Belgrade.
38 Besides being in open conflict with the nationalist elites, the HRG are also highly critical
towards those fractions of civil society that cooperate with, or have become partners of,
the government. The split within what used to constitute a common front in opposition
to the regime of Milosevic is manifested by the divorce between organizations seeking to
establish a pragmatic dialogue with the new authorities, and those radical human rights
groups challenging the foundations of the new order. The divergent views were publicly
expressed through a lengthy polemic between members of civil society that took place in
the weekly newspaper 'Vreme' in 2002 20.  On the one hand, the human rights activists
blamed the independent media, especially B92 and the weekly 'Vreme', of collaborating
with the elites in concealing and mitigating the war crimes and avoiding to mention the
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responsibility of Serbian society. In their view, public disregard for war crimes trials was
the intended result of inadequate media coverage of these issues in Serbia. On the other
hand, these charges were refuted by representatives of the media sector who attributed
the failure of Serbian society to address the legacy of war crimes to the incapacity of the
ICTY and local human rights organizations to generate public engagement with the past
in Serbia. Indeed, the human rights NGOs have been subject to severe criticism from their
former comrades for being excessively politicized and for having adopted an aggressive
strategy of 'confronting' the public with the past, which has not produced the desired
effects on society. 
39 Although  cooperation  with  the  Hague  tribunal  is  an  intrinsic  component  of  the  EU
conditionality towards the Western Balkans, EU assistance for civil society in Serbia has
largely bypassed those organizations dealing with war crimes and transitional justice.
Indeed, EU policy with regard to war crimes in the Western Balkans essentially consists in
pressuring the governments from the region to cooperate with the ICTY. It  does not
involve any support for local human rights advocacy groups, which do not have access to
EIDHR funding. This policy can be explained by the reluctance of EU institutions to get
involved into any kind of partisan politics at the domestic level. As mentioned earlier,
war crimes issues are extremely sensitive and highly politicized.  This is illustrated by the
frequent clashes between HRGs and right-wing organizations that promote nationalist
values  and  glorify  the  suspected  war  criminals.  While  most  of  these  right-wing
organizations are affiliated to the Serbian Radical Party, several representatives of the
most prominent HRGs are sitting on the political council of the Liberal-Democratic Party.
In  those  circumstances,  any support  for  HRGs  from the  EU would  be  interpreted as
involvement in domestic politics and open hostility towards the nationalist elites.
40 The absence of a coherent European democracy assistance policy in Serbia has led to the
emergence  of  conflicting  interests  within  the  donor-driven  civil  society.  These
divergences became visible in April 2007, when several human rights NGOs appealed to
the EU not to sign the SAA with Serbia before it  had handed over all  suspected war
criminals to The Hague. These organizations have suggested the EU adopt a new kind of
dialogue with Serbia that would include civil society, youth, small entrepreneurs and pro-
European  parties.  The  'institutionalized'  NGOs,  led  by  the  European  Movement,
immediately reacted by expressing their disagreement with these appeals. Nevertheless,
these different fractions within civil society have shown that they are able to overcome
their differences when their common interests are imperiled. This is best illustrated by
their common appeals calling upon the EU to sign the SAA with Serbia as soon as possible
and condemning the emerging anti-European discourse in Serbia  in the wake of  the
presidential elections in January 2008. Indeed, it seems that in view of the deteriorating
political climate, the human rights NGOs have rallied to the cause of accelerating Serbia's
rapprochement with the EU in order to prevent 'non- and quasi- democratic forces from
once again isolating the country'21.
 
Conclusion 
41 The emphasis placed by the EU/EAR on capacity-building has,  inadvertently perhaps,
served to reinforce the dichotomy between the community of professional NGOs on one
hand, and “political” civil society on the other: granting projects to non-political service
provider  NGOs  has  helped  institutionalise  such  organisations  and  their  activities  as
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‘acceptable’ civil society. By engaging them in what amounts to low-level partnerships
with the state, contracting them to deliver services in the community, and raising their
profile generally in society the EAR has helped consolidate the status of organisations
such  as  the  European  Movement,  Group  484  and  other  Belgrade-based  NGOs  as
institutional representations of civil society.
42 On the other hand, the human rights groups that are dealing with politically sensitive
issues are generally ineligible for EU assistance by virtue of the issues on which they
work,  and  are  therefore  being  further  marginalized  and  ostracised.  For  critics,  this
merely contributes to the legitimization of  the government’s  illiberal  political  stance
towards politically-engaged civil society and towards issues such as human and minority
rights. In their pursuit of good governance and intra-sectoral partnership, the EU and
other  donors  stand  accused  of  having  failed  to  challenge  the  political  and  moral
discourses that stand as the greatest impediments to the emergence in Serbia of a truly
civil society based on western values22. 
43 Partnership  between  the  non-governmental  and  governmental  sectors  is  indeed  an
aspect of developing civil society. But in situations where the state is weak, or lacking in
its commitment to upholding liberal rights, the capacity of civil society organisations to
articulate  a  political  critique  and  engage  in  deliberation  with  government  is  vital.
Whether or not foreign donors can contribute towards the development of this aspect of
civil society remains open to question.
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Josep Lloveras, took up the issue and placed it on the list of 15 priorities that Serbia has to deal
with as part of the SAp.
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study with  a  view to  negotiating  directives  for  a  stabilization  and association agreement."  (
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26/7/07.
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Commission’s priorities and funds for Serbia in the context of the IPA framework. Critics of this
decision  emphasise  that  the  EAR  has  proved  to  be  an  efficient  aid  agency,  which  enjoys
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12.  Interview with Vassilis Petrides, The European Agency for Reconstruction (EAR), 23rd March
2007, Belgrade.
13.  Interview with Vassilis Petrides, The European Agency for Reconstruction (EAR), 23rd March
2007, Belgrade.
14.  EuropeAid/123857/L/ACT/CS (2006).
15.  Interview with Jelena Radojkovic, Belgrade Centre for Human Rights, 22nd March 2007 (Belgrade)
16.  For example, projects run by International Aid Network (Belgrade) and Srpski savet za izbeglice
(Serbian Refugee Council).
17.  Srpski Demokratski Forum and International Aid Network (Belgrade).
18.  For example, Royal Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Olaf Palme International Centre,
OSCE,  Council  of  Europe,  Royal  Danish Embassy,  Canadian International  Development Agency
(CIDA), Open Society Institute in Belgrade (Soros Foundation).
19. For  instance,  the  vicious  personal  attacks  on  Sonja  Biserko,  president  of  the  Helsinki
Committee and a leading human rights activist in the former Yugoslavia, in mainstream  and
respected publications such as Politika (3rd September 2006), Ogledalo (6th July 2006), Srpski nacional
(19th June 2005).  Biserko, a Nobel prize nominee in 2005, was physically attacked outside her
home in Belgrade and was repeatedly castigated in the media for speaking out against human
rights abuses and the issue of Srebrenica in particular.
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ABSTRACTS
This paper looks at the impact of EU intervention on the third sector in post-Milosevic Serbia. We
argue that the framing of EU pre-accession assistance to Serbia in terms of  ‘developing civil
society’ is a political distraction; it obfuscates the true purpose and outcomes of EU intervention
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by implying that the focus of aid is the empowerment and strengthening of civil society as an
arena of political  contestation and as the basis of democratic regime change. In practice,  EU
assistance has as its goal far less politically radical objectives: the aim is to build governance and
state capacity.
Cet  article  examine  l'impact  de  l'intervention  de  l'UE  sur  le  tiers-secteur  dans  la  Serbie  de
l'après-Milosevic. Nous sommes d'avis que l'élaboration de l'aide de pré-adhésion à la Serbie en
termes de «développement de la société civile» est une politique de distraction, il cache le vrai
but  et  les  résultats  de  l'intervention de  l'UE  en  sous-entendant  que  la  priorité  de  l'aide  est
l'autonomisation et  le  renforcementde la  société  civile,  en tant  que scène de la  contestation
politique  et  en  tant  que  base  du  changement  du  régime  démocratique.  Dans  la  pratique,
l'assistance de l'UE a des objectifs beaucoup moins radicaux sur le plan politique : l'objectif est de
renforcer la gouvernance et la capacité de l'État.
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